Motor inhibition to dangerous objects: Electrophysiological evidence for task-dependent aversive affordances by Mustile, Magda et al.
For Review Only
Motor inhibition to dangerous objects: Electrophysiological 
evidence for task-dependent aversive affordances
Journal: Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Manuscript ID JOCN-2020-0259.R1
Manuscript Type: Original
Date Submitted by the 
Author: 23-Nov-2020
Complete List of Authors: Mustile, Magda; University of Stirling, Psychology
Giocondo, Flora; ISTC CNR, Computational and Translational 
Neuroscience Laboratory
Caligiore, Daniele; ISTC CNR, Computational and Translational 
Neuroscience Laboratory
Borghi, Anna; Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Dynamic and 
Clinical Psychology; ISTC CNR, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and 
Technologies
Kourtis, Dimitrios; University of Stirling, Psychology
Keywords: EEG, perception, contextual information, object affordances, dangerous objects
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
This is the author’s final version. This article has been accepted for publication in Journal of Cognitive 




Motor inhibition to dangerous objects: Electrophysiological evidence for task-dependent 
aversive affordances
Magda Mustile1, Flora Giocondo2, Daniele Caligiore2, Anna M. Borghi3,4, Dimitrios Kourtis1
1 Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
2 Computational and Translational Neuroscience Laboratory, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and 
Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
3 Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
4 Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
Corresponding author: Magda Mustile
Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
magda.mustile@stir.ac.uk
Keywords: 
EEG, perception, contextual information, object affordances, dangerous objects
ABSTRACT
Previous work suggests that perception of an object automatically facilitates actions related to 
object grasping and manipulation. Recently, the notion of automaticity has been challenged by 
behavioral studies suggesting that dangerous objects elicit aversive affordances that interfere 
with encoding of an object’s motor properties; however, related electrophysiological studies 
have provided little support for these claims. We sought EEG evidence that would support the 
operation of an inhibitory mechanism that interferes with the motor encoding of dangerous 
objects and we investigated whether such mechanism would be modulated by the perceived 
distance of an object and the goal of a given task. Electroencephalograms were recorded by 24 
participants who passively perceived dangerous and neutral objects in their peripersonal, 
boundary or extrapersonal space and performed either a reachability judgment task or a 
categorization task. Our results showed that greater attention, reflected in the visual P1 potential, 
was drawn by dangerous and reachable objects. Crucially, a frontal N2 potential, associated with 
motor inhibition, was larger for dangerous objects only when participants performed a 
reachability judgment task. Furthermore, a larger parietal P3b potential for dangerous objects 
indicated the greater difficulty in linking a dangerous object to the appropriate response, 
especially when it was located in the participants’ extrapersonal space. Taken together, our 
results show that perception of dangerous objects elicits aversive affordances in a task-dependent 































































way and provides evidence for the operation of a neural mechanism that does not code 
affordances of dangerous objects automatically, but rather on the basis of contextual information. 
 INTRODUCTION
A well-established concept in object perception research, is that the passive observation of 
graspable objects can potentiate the possible actions that we can perform with them (Grafton et 
al., 1997; Grèzes et al., 2003; Rice et al., 2007; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001; Ellis & Tucker, 
2000). This phenomenon is related to the concept of ‘affordances’ (Gibson, 1977) which has 
been a topic of great interest in literature and has been a matter of theoretical debate (for a recent 
review, see Osiurak et al., 2017). Here, we will refer to the term ‘affordances’ to indicate the 
action possibilities offered to an individual from the environment, and more specifically when an 
individual perceives a graspable object (Chemero, 2003; Borghi & Riggio, 2015). Actions can be 
‘afforded’ or potentiated when certain object features are compatible with the motor capacities of 
the perceiver (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 2004). For example, it has been shown that 
motor responses are facilitated when the object size is congruent with the shape of the hand grip 
(Ellis & Tucker, 2000) or when the handle is spatially compatible with the side of the responding 
hand (Riggio et al., 2008; Symes et al., 2005), even if the size and the handle position are not 
relevant to a given task. In recent years the view that affordances are always activated 
automatically, independently from the task or context, has been challenged (for reviews, see van 
Elk et al., 2014; Borghi, 2019; Ellis, 2018). Much evidence has been provided, showing that 
activation of affordances is task- and context- dependent and may rely on the goals and 
intentions of the perceiver. Affordances are not activated in tasks that involve only processing of 
superficial object features, such as color (e.g. Tipper et al., 2006; Pellicano et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, their activation is influenced by the context, for example by the presence of other 
objects (e.g. Borghi et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2015; Yoon et al., 2010), by the scene in which they 
are embedded (e.g. Kalénine et al., 2014) and by the distance between the object and the agent 
(Costantini et al., 2010; Ellis et al., 2013). For example, evidence shows that affordances are 
activated only or to a larger extent when they are placed in a person’s reachable space 
(Costantini et al., 2011; Cardellicchio et al., 2011; Kalénine et al., 2016; Rowe et al., 2017; 
Previc, 1998).
The reachable space, also called ‘peripersonal’ space for action, is particularly relevant for our 
interactions with the environment, as it represents the private area surrounding the body 
(Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Holmes & Spence, 2004) and delineates the immediate dimension in 
which we can directly act upon objects (di Pellegrino & Ladavas, 2015). By contrast, the space 































































that is beyond this boundary, also known as ‘extrapersonal’ space, represents the area that cannot 
be reached directly (Previc, 1998; Holmes & Spence, 2004). Objects that are placed in the 
margin of the peripersonal space rapidly attract attention, especially if they represent a threat to 
the individual’s safety (Graziano & Cook, 2006). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that 
dangerous stimuli are detected faster and prioritized in visual selection compared to neutral ones 
(Ohman et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 2014, Blanchette, 2006; Smith et al., 2003; Zhao, 2016). 
When a dangerous object is detected in the environment, individuals need to act quickly, 
preparing the body to a defensive reaction, typically indicated as a flight or fight (Pichon et al., 
2012; Brown et al., 1969).
The urgency to act in response to threats increases when the dangerous stimuli are physically 
closer (Pichon et al., 2012). However, according to ‘the threat-signal hypothesis’ (Cole et al., 
2013), dangerous objects may also lead to a perceptual bias, and appear to be physically closer 
compared to non-threatening ones. Similarly, threatening faces are perceived as closer in space 
than disgusting or neutral ones (Cole et al., 2013). Coello et al. (2012) showed that when an 
individual makes reachability judgements, a dangerous object is perceived closer when the 
threatening part is oriented towards the participants, compared to when it is oriented away from 
them.
It is believed that reachability judgments are made in relation to the action possibilities that an 
object offers and that they involve the mental representation of the actual reaching action and the 
anticipated sensory and spatial consequences (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2010). This suggests that 
the shift of attention towards action-related features of an object may be critical to trigger the 
activation of affordances (Hommel et al., 2001; Sevos et al., 2016). Interestingly, whereas 
neuroimaging (Makin et al., 2007; Gentile et al., 2011; Bartolo et al., 2014; Delevoye-Turrell,et 
al., 2010) and electrophysiological (EEG) (Sambo & Foster, 2008; Goslin et al., 2012; Valdés-
Conroy et al., 2014) investigations have suggested that the display of reachable objects can 
automatically activate motor brain networks, other studies have challenged the notion of 
automaticity, showing that task goals and hand postures may have a critical  modulatory 
influence on sensorimotor representations (Thill et al., 2013). Bub & Masson (2010) showed that 
the compatibility effect (i.e. faster responses when the handle is aligned with the hand) emerges 
only when participants were required to make a reach and grasp response, but not when the task 
required a key press. Witt et al. (2005) demonstrated that when participants held a tool with the 
intention to use it, the perceived boundary of the peripersonal space was expanded. However, 
when participants did not intend to reach an object, the extent of the perceived boundary of the 
peripersonal space was the same, with or without holding a tool. Wamain et al. (2016) 































































demonstrated that EEG activity over motor areas was modulated by the location of the object 
only when the participant was asked to make a reachability judgment, but not when performing 
an object discrimination task. Furthermore, it has been shown that prefrontal areas associated to 
top-down control can contribute to updating the neural representations of objects and contexts 
suitable for controlling movements so as to best pursue the person’s goals (Hamilton & Grafton, 
1993; Fogassi et al., 2005). More specifically, reciprocal fronto-parietal and fronto-temporal 
connections (Fuster, 2008; Chelazzi et al., 1993) are critically involved in the top-down 
affordance processing control according to environmental contexts and attentional resources 
availability (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Knudsen, 2007).
To summarize, previous research suggests that objects placed in the peripersonal space can 
rapidly attract our attention, and that the perception of proximity might be amplified when the 
object is dangerous, because it represents an immediate threat to our safety. However, the 
processing of object motor-related information and the activation of affordances does not occur 
automatically when objects are reachable, but it depends on a given the task goal, for example 
when participants have to estimate the reachability, but not when they have to judge other object 
features (i.e. categorize the object). Behavioral studies on the perception of dangerous objects 
showed that, whereas neutral stimuli facilitate actions, eliciting faster responses, dangerous 
objects generate an ‘interference’ effect that slows down the motor response, which occurs 
independently of the task (e.g. categorization vs. bisection) or the display of an hand prime 
(Anelli et al., 2012; 2013a). In addition, Anelli et al. (2013b) investigated whether the dynamic 
presentation of neutral and dangerous stimuli (objects moving toward or away from the observer) 
would modulate the behavioral response. The results showed that responses were slower when 
dangerous objects moved toward the participants, suggesting that perception of dangerous 
objects may evoke aversive affordances, reflected in response inhibition. However, recent EEG 
studies seem to indicate that this is not the case. Liu et al. (2017; 2018a; 2018b) investigated the 
event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to dangerous objects combining a motor priming 
paradigm (Anelli et al., 2012) with a Go/NoGo task. Results showed that dangerous objects 
elicited a larger parietal P3 (P3b) potential compared to neutral ones in the Go but not in the 
NoGo trials, which was interpreted as an indication of recruitment of additional attentional 
resources when perceiving dangerous objects (Israel et al., 1980). In a later study, Cao et al. 
(2020) modified the perceptual salience of two stimuli in a similar motor priming paradigm 
combined with a shape categorization task and found a larger frontal P3 (P3a) for dangerous 
objects compared to safe objects, but only for objects with relatively small perceptual salience. 
Interestingly, the frontal N2 potential, typically associated with motor inhibition (Falkenstein et 
al., 1999; Smith et al., 2007) was similar in response to dangerous and neutral stimuli, providing 































































no evidence that dangerous objects are automatically encoded in motor terms and elicit aversive 
affordances. However, all EEG studies on processing of dangerous objects (Liu et al., 2017; 
2018a; 2018b; Cao et al., 2020) have been limited to stimuli with low ecological validity (e.g. 
round vs. rectangular saw blades) and a narrow range of cognitive tasks (Go/NoGo and shape 
categorization tasks). 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the processing of dangerous objects with a larger 
set of graspable stimuli and to clarify whether the location of the object and the goal of the task 
modulate the encoding of the object’s motor properties. In order to test our hypotheses, we used 
a paradigm similar to Wamain et al. (2016) to design a controlled EEG experiment including a 
large set of graspable stimuli. Stimuli were rated through an online questionnaire by an 
independent sample of participants and then divided in two categories (dangerous vs neutral). A 
pre-experiment session was conducted prior to the main experiment in order to determine the 
extent of the perceived peripersonal space for each participant. In the main experiment, the 
selected dangerous and neutral objects were presented in three different spaces (peripersonal, 
boundary and extrapersonal) according to the subjective perceived maximum reachable point. 
Participants were asked to perform a reachability judgment task and a categorization task. We 
predicted that the dangerous objects would elicit distinct ERPs, which would be differently 
modulated by the location of the objects and by the goal of the perceptual task.
 More specifically, we hypothesized that the participants would pay more attention to 
dangerous objects especially when they are located within their peripersonal space. We predicted 
that this would be reflected in an enlarged amplitude of the occipital P1 potential, which is 
considered an index of attentional processes toward relevant stimuli attributes (Johannes et al., 
1995; Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Hermann & Knight, 2001). In addition, we hypothesized 
that a reaching action towards the object would be inhibited when the participants judge the 
reachability of an object (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2010), more so in the case of a dangerous 
object. Consequently, we predicted a larger amplitude of the frontal N2 potential in reachability 
judgments of dangerous objects, possibly when they are located close to the observer. Moreover, 
we predicted that activation of the link connecting the displayed object to the appropriate action 
towards it should be reflected in the amplitude of the parietal P3b potential (Verleger, 2020), 
which should be larger when the participants perceive a dangerous object (Cao et al., 2020). 
METHODS
Participants































































Twenty-four healthy right-handed participants (16 female and 8 male; age range = 18-28; mean 
age = 21.46 years, SD = 2.9 years) took part in the experiment. The sample size was chosen 
according to previous EEG investigations (Liu et al., 2017; Cao et al., 2020). All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. The experiment was approved by the University of 
Stirling Ethics Committee and all participants provided their written informed consent.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 16 color pictures of non-living objects, half of which would be normally 
grasped with a precision grip and the other half with a power grip (Table 1). There were two 
categories (dangerous/neutral) with 8 objects each. The objects were rated by an independent 
group of 104 participants on a five point Likert scale (Likert, 1932) according to harmfulness 
(danger/neutral), harmfulness to people (if used towards other people), knowledge (familiarity), 
dangerousness to grasp, visual complexity and belonging to the category of artifacts or natural 
objects (typicality). Paired sample t-tests revealed significant differences for harmfulness [t(7) = 
8.73, p < .001], for harmfulness to people [t(7) = 9.453, p < .001] and dangerousness to grasp 
[t(7) = 11.789, p< .001], but no difference for familiarity, visual complexity or typicality. In 
addition, 8 pictures of plants selected online were used for the categorization task.
Table 1: Objects used in the main experiment.

















All objects were processed with Gimp 2.0 in order to remove the background and presented at 
two different orientations (i.e. graspable part to the left or to the right, Figure 1). Each object was 
linearly scaled and shaded to enhance the 3D perception. They were presented in their original 
shape and placed in different locations, according to individual perceived peripersonal space, in 
the middle of a table with a black background. The images were projected on an 86” projection 
screen using a projector in a dark room. The visual scene consisted of an image 180 cm x 150 
cm. All stimuli were presented at -35 cm, -30 cm, -25 cm (peripersonal space), -5 cm, 0, +5 cm 































































(boundary space), + 25 cm, +30 cm, +35 cm (extrapersonal space) of the perceived maximum 
reachable space.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Procedure
Determination of perceived maximum reachable space.
A pre-experiment session was used to determine the extent of the perceived maximum reachable 
space. Three different objects (a ball, a bowling pin, and a glass) were presented on the table. 
Each object was linearly scaled and shaded to enhance the 3D perception. The images were 
projected via E-prime 3.0 on an 86” projection screen using a projector in the same dark room of 
the main experiment. The visual scene consisted of an image 180 cm x 150 cm. The locations of 
the objects randomly varied between 5 cm from the edge of the table and 145 cm in steps of 5 
cm (29 locations). Each object was shown 10 times in each location, which resulted in a total of 
348 trials. Participants were comfortably seated on a chair 100 cm away from the screen and 
asked to judge whether the object was reachable/not reachable from their position without 
moving or stretching the arm or the shoulder. Each image remained on the screen until a verbal 
response was provided. Answers were provided vocally and recorded by the experimenter. The 
boundary of perceived maximum reachable space was determined using a maximum likelihood 
method based on the second-order derivatives (quasi-newton method) to obtain the logit 
regression model that best fitted the participants reachable/unreachable space using the equation: 
y = e (α + βX)/(1 + e (α + βX), in which y was the participant’s response, X was the distance of 
the stimulus, and  (α /β) was the critical value of X corresponding to the transition between 
reachable/unreachable stimuli, thus expressing the perceived maximum reachable space 
(Wamain et al., 2016). The individual perceived maximal reachable space was used to select the 
location of the objects presented in the main experiment. The length of the participants' right arm 
and maximal reachable actual point (i.e. maximal point reachable on a table with the right finger) 
was measured.
Main experiment
In the main experiment, participants were firstly informed that they would have to perform two 
different tasks: a Reachability Judgment task (RJT) and a Discrimination - Categorization task 
(DCT). Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of two trials for both RJT and the DCT. For both tasks, 
objects were presented centrally at different locations for 1000ms; the inter-stimulus interval 
randomly varied between 1500-1900 ms (Proverbio et al., 2012; Wamain et al., 2016). The 































































combination of category (neutral/dangerous) and location (9 locations, 3 for each space - 
peripersonal, boundary and extrapersonal) was randomly selected for each trial. After the display 
of the object, a question (‘Reachable?’ for RJT, ‘Natural?’ for the DCT) appeared in 20% of the 
trials for each block (catch trials). Participants were asked to respond as fast as possible by 
pressing a foot-pedal either with the left or with the right foot. Questions remained on the screen 
until the answer was provided. In the RJT participants indicated whether the object was 
reachable or not reachable from their position without moving or stretching the arm or their 
shoulder. Participants performed a total of 432 trials divided in 4 experimental blocks. In the 
DCT participants were shown also images of the plants and they were asked to indicate whether 
the object was natural or not. Participants performed a total of 504 trials divided in 6 
experimental blocks; Trials in which the plants appeared (72 trials in total) were excluded from 
the analysis. In each task, there were 72 trials per space for neutral objects and 72 trials per space 
for dangerous objects. The order of the two tasks and the side of the response (left/right) was 
counterbalanced across participants.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Data acquisition 
Behavioral data
Behavioral data were recorded by the foot-pedal box on which participants had placed their feet.
Electrophysiological data
EEG data were continuously recorded continuously with Ag/AgCl electrodes from 64 scalp 
electrodes (Neuroscan system). The electrodes were positioned following the International 10-20 
system. Vertical and horizontal eye movements were monitored using two pairs of electro-
oculography (EOG) electrodes placed above and below the left eye and lateral to the external 
side of the eyes. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a band-pass of 0–250 Hz. 
Data Processing and Analysis
Electrophysiological data
EEG data analysis was performed using BrainVision Analyzer software (Brain Products GmbH, 
Gilching, Germany). Data were high-pass filtered at 0.05 Hz and low-pass filtered at 50 Hz. Data 
were re-referenced to the mean of the left and right mastoid electrodes. Ocular correction was 
performed using an infomax Independent Component Analysis. Data were segmented into 































































epochs from 500ms before to 1500ms after the stimulus onset. Epochs contaminated by artifacts 
were rejected using an Automatic artifact rejection method. An epoch was rejected if the 
difference between the minimum and the maximum value of a single channel exceeded 100 µV. 
On average, 5.5% of epochs per condition was excluded from the analysis after artifact rejection. 
Data were baseline corrected (-200ms to 0) and then averaged across participants. The ERPs 
were identified by visual inspection of the grand average of the different conditions during the 
relevant time window. ERP amplitudes were quantified by pooling the activity of neighboring 
electrodes within the time periods of interest (for details, see Results).
Statistical analyses of EEG data were performed by 2x2x3 ANOVAs (Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected) with factors Category (dangerous vs neutral), Task (DCT vs RJT) and Space 
(peripersonal vs boundary vs extrapersonal). Significant interactions were further investigated 
via post-hoc paired t-tests.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
In the pre-experiment data, we found that the boundary of the perceived maximal reachable 
space (perceived reachable space = 49.0 ± 7.6cm) corresponded to a 19.9% overestimation of the 
actual reachable space (reachable space = 39.2 ± 5.7cm). Although participants were required to 
provide a response only in the 20% of trials (catch trials), 2x3 ANOVAs with factors Category 
(dangerous vs neutral) and Space (peripersonal vs boundary vs extrapersonal) repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted to assess differences between reaction times separately for the RTJ 
and the DCT. The Greenhouse-Geisser was used where the assumption of sphericity was 
violated and post-hoc paired sample t-tests were adjusted using Bonferroni correction. In the RTJ 
a main effect of Space (F(1, 21) = 16.33, p < .001, ῃp2 = .438) revealed that participants were 
slower in the judgment of the boundary space compared to the extrapersonal (t(21) = -6.85, p < 
.001) and to the peripersonal one (t(21) = 3.817, p < 001). In the DCT, the ANOVA did not 
reveal any significant main effects or interaction (p > .05). Generally, participants were slower 
for dangerous compared to neutral objects in both the RTJ (dangerous = 1069.0 ± 314; neutral = 
996.8 ± 340) and the DCT (dangerous = 1093.7 ± 229.7; neutral = 1053.1±252.2) but the 
comparisons did not reach the statistical significance (p > .05).
Electrophysiological data
As expected, the inspection of the EEG data revealed that the onset of the stimuli elicited an 
occipital P1, a frontal N2 and a parietal P3b. We also identified a large frontal N400, which was 































































also analyzed in order to have a complete picture of all the cognitive processes that are related to 
object affordances.
P1
The P1 was quantified as the mean amplitude of electrodes O1, O2 and Oz between 150 and 
180ms after object onset. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Category (F(1, 23) = 8.61,  p 
<.01, ῃp2= .272, Figure 3) showing that the P1 was larger for dangerous objects compared to 
neutral objects.  Also, a main effect of Space (F(1, 23) = 3.83, p <.05, ῃp2 = .143) showed that the 
P1 was larger when objects were presented closer to the participant. Post hoc paired sample t-
tests showed a statistically significant difference between boundary and extrapersonal space 
(t(23) = 2.76, p < .05) and a marginally significant difference peripersonal extrapersonal space 
(t(23)=1.86, p = .075). There were no other statistically significant main effects or interactions (p 
> .05).
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
N2
The N2 was quantified as the mean amplitude of electrodes FPz, FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, Fz, F1, F2 
between 200ms and 260ms after object onset. A main effect of Category (F(1, 23) = 5.69,  p < 
.05, ῃp2 = .198) showed that N2 was larger for dangerous compared to neutral objects. Moreover, 
there was a significant Category x Task interaction (F(1, 23) = 6.83,  p < .05, ῃp2 = .229, Figure 
4). Post hoc paired sample t-tests showed that the N2 was larger in the RJT for dangerous 
compared to neutral objects (t(23) = -3.09, p < .01) whereas there was no difference in the DCT, 
(p = .503). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (p > .05).
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
P3b
The P3b was quantified as the mean amplitude of electrodes Pz, POz, P1, P2, PO3 and PO4 
between 315ms and 375ms after object onset. A main effect of the Category (F(1, 23) = 36.82,  p 
< .001, ῃp2 = .616) revealed that the P3b was significantly larger for dangerous compared to 
neutral objects. In addition there was a significant Category x Space interaction (F(1, 23) = 3.53,  
p < .05, ῃp2 = .133, Figure 5), because the difference in P3b amplitude between dangerous and 
neutral objects was significantly larger in the peripersonal space compared to the difference in 
the boundary (t(23) = 2.80, p < .01) and marginally significant to the difference in the 
extrapersonal space (t(23) = 2.05, p = .051).































































The main effect of Space (F(1,23) = 17.53, p < .001, ῃp2 = .433) indicated that the amplitude of 
the P3b was inversely related to perceived reachable space. More specifically, the P3b was 
smaller in the peripersonal space compared to the boundary (t(23) = -4.60, p < .001) or to the 
extrapersonal space (t(23) = -4.28, p <.001), but not in the boundary compared to the 
extrapersonal space  (t(23) = -1.87, p = .074). Furthermore, a significant Task x Space interaction 
(F(1, 23) = 3.69,  p < .05, ῃp2 = .138) indicated that the P3b was larger in the DCT compared to 
the RJT when the object was placed in the peripersonal space (t(23) = -2.18, p < .05), but not in 
the boundary (p = .121) or in the extrapersonal space (p = .727). There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions (p > .05).
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
N400
The N400 was quantified as the mean amplitude of electrodes FPz, FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, Fz, F1, 
F2 between 450ms and 510ms after the onset of the object. The ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of Space (F(1, 23) = 6.82,  p < .05, ῃp2 = .229) showing that the N400 decreased with the 
perceived reachable space. The N400 was larger when the object was placed in the peripersonal 
space compared to the boundary (t(23) = 2.52, p < .05) or to the extrapersonal space (t(23) = -
2.70, p < .05) and in the boundary compared to the extrapersonal space (t(23) = -2.27, p < .05). 
There were no other significant main effects or interactions (p > .05).
DISCUSSION
We employed high-density electroencephalography to investigate the cognitive mechanisms 
associated with the processing of dangerous and neutral objects in relation to their perceived 
distance from a passive observer. Our results show that the participants paid more attention to 
objects that were presented closer to them, especially to dangerous ones. Importantly, our results 
demonstrate that affordances of dangerous objects were task-dependent and were coded around 
200ms after object onset. Furthermore, we found evidence for higher processing demands that 
link the perception of dangerous objects to the representation of the relevant actions compared to 
neutral objects, especially when they are perceived in one’s peripersonal space.
Our first hypothesis was that object location and dangerousness would modulate attentional 
processes. We focused our analysis on the occipital P1 potential, which is considered an index of 
early visual attentional processes (Johannes et al., 1995; Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; 
Hermann & Knight, 2001). The P1 was larger for objects that were presented within the 
observer’s peripersonal space and for dangerous objects compared to neutral ones, regardless of 































































the task. Previous studies showed that graspable objects located in the peripersonal space 
automatically activate attentional mechanisms that facilitate a potential interaction with proximal 
objects (Gallivan et al., 2009; Spence & Paris, 2010; Valdés-Conroy et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 
2002). However, in addition to object location, attention may be driven by other object 
characteristics, such as visually or functionally salient features (Pellicano et al., 2010; Kourtis & 
Vingerhoets, 2015) and its perceived threat value. Stimuli that pose a threat to ourselves or 
others are detected faster than neutral stimuli (Ohman et al., 2001; Blanchette, 2006; Smith et al., 
2003; Zhao, 2016) and prime our attention in order to enhance body responsiveness and 
preparation of defensive mechanisms, typically referred to as flight or fight reactions (Pichon et 
al., 2012; Brown et al., 1969). Accordingly, the modulation of the P1 shows that automatic 
allocation of attention depends on the proximity as well as the perceived dangerousness of an 
object regardless of the task performed. 
Our second hypothesis was that a reaching action towards the object would be inhibited when the 
participants judge the reachability of a dangerous object. We investigated the amplitude 
modulation of the  N2 potential, a fronto-central negativity, which is typically considered as an 
index of action inhibition (Munro et al., 2007; Bokura et al., 2002; Schmajuk et al., 2006; Kok et 
al., 2004; Pliszka et al., 2000; Huster et al., 2013). Our analysis showed that the N2 was larger in 
relation to the display of dangerous objects compared to neutral ones, but it was unaffected by 
the proximity of the objects. This finding is in line with the notion that perception of dangerous 
objects may evoke aversive affordances (Anelli et al., 2012; 2013a; 2013b). Importantly, this 
difference was significant only when participants made a reachability judgement, but not when 
they categorized the objects. This suggests the operation of a fast inhibitory mechanism (i.e. 
~200ms after object onset) that depends on the perceived dangerousness of an object. The onset 
of such inhibitory mechanism is consistent with previous findings (Proverbio et al., 2011; 2012; 
2013; Rowe et al., 2017). In addition, the present study demonstrates for the first time that 
coding of object affordances for dangerous objects is not a fully automatic process, but it rather 
depends on contextual information. This result is similar with data on affordances evoked by 
neutral objects in context obtained by a large number of behavioral (reviews in van Elk et al., 
2014; Borghi & Riggio, 2015) and neurophysiological and brain imaging studies (Fogassi et al., 
2005 and Thill et al. 2013 for a review). 
Previous EEG research on object affordances, showed that N2 may reflect the strength of the 
perception-action coupling (Wokke et al., 2016), is larger in response to the observation of tools 
compared to non-tools (Proverbio et al., 2011; 2012; 2013), and depends on the type of the grip 
(i.e. precision v. power) that a person uses in order to handle an object (Rowe et al. 2017).  































































Furthermore, Proverbio et al. (2011) suggested that the N2 that is elicited by the observation of 
tools is partially generated by the left premotor cortex and left somatosensory cortex, which is 
consistent with the operation of a left-lateralized ‘praxis’ network that codes object-directed 
movements (e.g.  Vingerhoets et al., 2012). This further corroborates our hypothesis that the N2 
in the present study reflects task-dependent inhibition of the motor system, which is more 
pertinent in the presence of dangerous objects (Anelli et al., 2012; 2013a; 2013b). It should be 
noted that previous EEG investigations on object perception have not reported a significant 
effect of the object’s dangerousness on the N2 amplitude (Liu et al., 2017; 2018a; 2018b; Cao et 
al., 2020). We believe that the apparent discrepancy with the results of the present study may be 
attributed to differences in the experimental design. These studies involved the performance of 
motor priming tasks, in which a dangerous or a neutral/safe object was always preceded by the 
display of a hand. It is plausible that the N2 did not reflect only object processing, but it was 
possibly influenced by a mot r resonance mechanism induced by the perception of the preceding 
hand (Anelli et al., 2013a). Nevertheless, further investigation is needed in order to clarify the 
source of this apparent discrepancy. 
Our third hypothesis was that the activation of the link between a perceived object and the 
appropriate motor response will be affected by the dangerousness of the object. To verify this, 
we focused on the parietal P3b potential. The P3b in the present study was larger in relation to 
dangerous objects compared to neutral ones and this difference was greater when the objects 
were located within the observer’s peripersonal space. The P3b is an endogenous cognitive 
potential, the functional significance of which is still a matter of debate. It has been considered to 
reflect context updating (Donchin & Coles, 1988) and working memory processes (Polich, 
2007), although it is likely that it is indirectly associated with working memory, reflecting 
reactivation of stimulus-response links (Verleger et al., 2017; Verleger 2020). In line with this 
account, which states that the P3b does not simply reflect stimulus processing mechanisms, other 
EEG studies suggest that it is related to response selection (Falkenstein et al. 1995; Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2003) and that its amplitude is enlarged by the difficulty of the task (Sawaki & 
Katayama, 2009; Waszak et al., 2005). Hence, our results suggest that the selection of the 
appropriate action toward an object is a more cognitively demanding process for dangerous 
objects compared to neutral objects, especially when they are located within reachable distance. 
Our results extend findings from previous EEG studies on perception of dangerous objects (Liu 
et al., 2017; 2018a; 2018b; Cao et al., 2020), highlighting the importance of the reachability of a 
dangerous object.































































Moreover, the P3b was larger when the objects were located in the observer’s extrapersonal 
space, suggesting the activation of a link between an object and the appropriate action was a 
more demanding process when the object was located outside the observer’s reach. This is 
consistent with previous studies that showed that activation of actions related to a graspable 
object is largely affected by the proximity of the object to the perceiver (Cardellicchio et al., 
2011; Costantini et al., 2010). We also found a significant interaction between task and space, 
because the P3b was smaller in the reachability judgment task only when the object was located 
in the peripersonal space. This shows that linking the perception of a proximal object to the 
appropriate action is easier in reachability judgements compared to categorization of the object, 
possibly because the proximity of the object facilitates action representation. Overall, our results 
agree with data supporting the key role of fronto-parietal and fronto-temporal connections in 
attention modulation and in the on-line control of visually guided movements (Andersen & 
Buneo, 2002; Buneo & Andersen, 2006; Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Knudsen, 2007) through the 
augmentation of the neural sensitivity related to the salient features of objects (Carrasco et al., 
2000).
In addition to the modulation of the ERPs of main interest, we observed a frontal negativity 
peaking around 480ms after stimulus onset, the amplitude of which was inversely related to the 
distance between object and the observer. This negativity could be considered as the N400 
potential which is considered as the brain’s response to any type of meaningful stimulus (Kutas 
& Federmeier, 2011) in language, (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; Johnson & Hamm, 2000), pictorial 
stimuli (Hamm et al., 2002), mathematics (Niedeggen et al., 1999), gestures (Wu & Coulson, 
2011), action-outcome relationships (Bach et al., 2009) and mismatches between objects and 
selected actions (Sitnikova et al., 2003). The frontal distribution of the N400 in the present study 
is consistent with previous findings that showed that the action-related N400 has a more frontal 
focus compared to the language-related N400 (Amoruso et al., 2013). Previous work on object 
affordances suggests that recognition of action-related tool properties requires the recall of motor 
and semantic information, stored in a broad fronto-parietal visuomotor network (Natraj et al., 
2013; 2018; Ramayya et al., 2010). Furthermore, Natraj et al. (2013) reported smaller N400-like 
amplitudes when pairs of objects were presented together with an interacting hand, which 
presumably constrained the action possibilities for the observer (Natraj et al., 2018). Taking 
everything into consideration, it is plausible that the decreased N400 in the present study when 
an object was located in the extrapersonal space reflects the limited action possibilities to interact 
with the object. This is in agreement with the view that activation of object affordances is not a 
purely automatic process, but rather depends on contextual information, such as the proximity of 
the object (van Elk et al., 2014; Borghi & Riggio, 2015).































































To summarize, the present study demonstrates that visual perception of a dangerous graspable 
object requires the engagement of greater attentional resources compared to a neutral object. 
Importantly, we provide evidence that aversive affordances are coded ~200ms after the display 
of a dangerous object when a passive observer estimates the distance of the object on the basis of 
its perceived reachability. Furthermore, our results suggest that linking the perception of a 
dangerous object to the representation of the corresponding grasping action is a cognitively 
demanding process, especially when the object is located outside a person’s peripersonal space. 
In conclusion, the present study provides strong electrophysiological evidence that challenges 
the notion of automaticity of object affordances, supporting the operation of a flexible 
mechanism that codes affordances of dangerous objects on the basis of contextual information.
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Figure 1. Representation of the visual scene and the orientations of a dangerous object placed in different 
locations seen by the participants in the main experiment. 
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of a sequence of two trials in (A) the Reachability Judgment Task and 
(B) the Discrimination-Categorization Task. 
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Figure 3. A) Grand average color-coded ERP waveforms. The rectangle indicates the period of interest for 
quantification of the P1 amplitude; time ‘0’ indicates object onset. B) P1 voltage scalp topography. C) P1 
amplitude as a function of Category. The asterisk indicates statistical significance. 
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Figure 4. A) Grand average color-coded ERP waveforms. The rectangle indicates the period of interest for 
quantification of the N2 and N400 amplitudes; time ‘0’ indicates object onset. B) N2 voltage scalp 
topography. C) N2 amplitude as a function of Category x Task. The asterisk indicates statistical significance 
whereas n.s. indicates non statistically significant difference. 
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Figure 5. A) Grand average color-coded ERP waveforms. The rectangle indicates the period of interest for 
quantification of the P3b amplitude; time ‘0’ indicates object onset. B) P3b voltage scalp topography. C) P3b 
amplitude as a function of Category and Category x Space. The asterisks indicate statistical significance 
whereas n.s. indicates non statistically significant difference. 
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